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Notes
Arizona v. Fulminante: Coerced Confessions
and the Harm in Harmless Error Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important issues frequently before the United
States Supreme Court is which constitutional protections should be
accorded to a criminal defendant's extrajudicial confession to a po-
lice officer or other government official.' Much controversy sur-
rounds this issue, largely because many confessions are elicited
during the course of police interrogations.2 Customarily, police in-
terrogations are conducted privately, 3 such that some concern ex-
ists that the police may employ coercive techniques during the
course of questioning to force a suspect to confess.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the reality of coercive
police activity,' and thus has consistently held that a coerced con-
fession6 is inadmissible as evidence in a criminal trial.' Indeed, in
twenty-five decisions spanning nearly ninety-five years, the
Supreme Court held that the admission of a coerced confession
would never be considered harmless error and, in fact, mandated
1. Throughout this Note, the terms "confession(s)" and "admission(s)" will be used
interchangeably. It should be noted, however, that some literature distinguishes between
the two by defining a "confession" as a full admission of guilt, and an "admission" as a
statement that merely tends to prove guilt. See, e.g., EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MC-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 144, at 361-62 (3d ed. 1984); GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 9.12, at 436 (2d ed. 1987).
2. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 6.1, at 261 (student ed. 1985).
3. See, e.g., Monrad G. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6
STAN. L. REV. 411, 411-12 (1954).
4. See, e.g., id. at 412-13; Wilfred J. Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Con-
fession Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 35, 42-43 (1962);
Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 938-39 (1966) [hereinaf-
ter Confessions].
5. For a discussion of some of the cases in which the Court has acknowledged that
coercive police practices exist, see Paulsen, supra note 3.
6. The Court has used the term "involuntary confession" as a "convenient short-
hand" for the term "coerced confession." See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246,
1252 n.3 (1991); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). Accordingly, the
terms "coerced confession" and "involuntary confession" will be used interchangeably in
this Note.
7. For a list of these cases, see infra note 39.
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an automatic reversal.' This automatic reversal rule was applied
even in those instances in which sufficient evidence existed, in-
dependent of the involuntary confession, to establish the guilt of
the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.9
On March 26, 1991, a sharply divided 10 United States Supreme
Court overturned that long line of precedent." In Arizona v.
Fulminante, ' 2 the Court held that the admission of a coerced con-
fession need not result in an automatic reversal."a The Court held
that a reviewing court may instead apply a "harmless error analy-
sis"" to determine whether the admission of the confession into
evidence was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'' 5
Although there are actually three separate holdings in Fulmi-
nante,16 this Note will focus on the Court's holding that a harmless
error analysis is applicable to the erroneous admission of a coerced
confession. It will begin with an examination of the background
surrounding the well-established rule that excludes such confes-
sions from evidence in a criminal trial. 17 This Note will also con-
sider the harmless error doctrine and the reasons why the Court,
until Fulminante, consistently declined to apply such an analysis to
cases involving coerced confessions.'8 After discussing the lower
court and the Supreme Court decisions in Fulminante,'9 this Note
will consider some of the defects in the reasoning used by the
Court to reach the conclusion that a harmless error analysis ap-
plies to erroneously admitted coerced confessions. 20 Finally, this
Note will discuss the possible impact of the Fulminante decision
on our system of justice.2'
8. See infra note 39.
9. See, e.g., infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 121 for the shifting coalitions among the Supreme Court Justices.
11. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1265.
14. For one definition of "harmless error analysis," see infra text accompanying note
194.
15. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1265.
16. The Court decided that Fulminante's confession was coerced, that coerced con-
fessions are subject to a harmless error analysis, and that the admission of Fulminante's
coerced confession was not harmless error. See infra notes 121-59 and accompanying
text.
17. See infra notes 22-59 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 108-74 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 175-222 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
Before discussing the Arizona v. Fulminante decision, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the case is best understood in the context of
the Court's prior decisions in this area. Accordingly, this back-
ground section first considers how the Court defines "voluntary
confessions. "22 Next, this section discusses the history of the inad-
missibility of coerced confessions and the rule that required an au-
tomatic reversal of a conviction in those instances where a coerced
confession had been admitted into evidence at a criminal trial.23
Finally, this section considers the Court's prior decisions that held
that a harmless error analysis should never be applied to coerced
confessions. 4
A. The Definition of a Voluntary Confession
Involuntary confessions are always inadmissible as evidence in a
criminal trial.25 Voluntary confessions, however, may be used
against the defendant.26 The admissibility of a confession thus de-
pends upon whether the confession was "voluntarily" made by the
accused. 27
The issue of whether a particular confession was made volunta-
rily is one of federal constitutional law.28  Accordingly, a lower
court's determination of the issue is not dispositive.2 9 Rather, the
Supreme Court must make its own determination based upon an
independent evaluation of the record. 30  In so doing, the Court
must employ a two-hundred-year-old "voluntariness" test which
asks whether the confession was the result of the criminal suspect's
free will.3'
A review of United States Supreme Court decisions32 reveals
22. See infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 39-59 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
26. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
27. For a discussion of the federal voluntariness requirement, see CLEARY, supra note
1, § 147, at 372-76.
28. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1261, 1246 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
29. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
30. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
31. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
602 (1961)).
32. For a list of some of the cases in which the Court has addressed the issue of
whether a confession was made "voluntarily," see Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321
n.2 (1959).
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that no single factor determines whether an individual's will has
been overcome in a particular instance. 33 Instead, the Court his-
torically has scrutinized all of the circumstances surrounding the
confession, 34 including both the details of the interrogation that re-
sulted in the confession, and the personal characteristics of the ac-
cused.35 If the Court determines that the confession was obtained
as a result of either physical or mental36 coercive police practices, 37
the confession will be deemed inadmissible regardless of whether it
is true.38
B. The Longstanding Rule of Automatic Reversal
In a series of decisions that spanned nearly ninety-five years, the
Supreme Court unequivocally held that the erroneous admission of
a coerced confession in a criminal trial would result in an auto-
matic reversal. 39 The Court, however, never articulated the precise
33. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
34. Id. (noting that the Court considers the "totality of all the surrounding
circumstances").
35. Id. The Court determines the "factual circumstances surrounding the confession,
assesse[s] the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluate[s] the legal significance
of how the accused reacted." Id. (citing Culombe, 367 U.S. at 603). The details of the
interrogation considered relevant by the Court may relate to "the government's conduct
and the conditions under which the suspect was questioned, including the site and length
of interrogation or detention, whether counsel was made available, and whether the sus-
pect was advised of his constitutional rights." Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7-8, Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (No.
89-839); see also Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 745-46 (1966) (citing the lack of
advice to the accused regarding his constitutional rights); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143, 153 (1944) (noting the prolonged and repeated nature of the interrogation); Cham-
bers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1940) (considering the length of detention).
The relevant details that the Court may consider regarding the characteristics of the
accused include "ones that affect his vulnerability to pressure, such as his age, intelli-
gence, education, criminal experience, and physical condition." Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7-8, Fulminante (No. 89-839); see also
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (considering the lack of education of the
accused); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196-97 (1957) (citing the low intelligence of
the accused); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600 (1948) (noting the young age of the
accused).
36. The Court "has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and
that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
37. Before a court may determine that a confession is involuntary, the confession
must be found to result from a coercive police activity. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157, 164 (1986).
38. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964) (citing Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)).
39. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73
(1983); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
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theoretical underpinnings of this automatic reversal rule."' Never-
theless, it appears that most of the Court's decisions are predicated
upon one of three theories: a due process theory; an evidence the-
ory; or a "hybrid" evidence-due process approach.4'
1. The History of the Voluntariness Requirement 2
In 1897, the United States Supreme Court held that, in federal
criminal trials, the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment governs whether an accused's confession was given volunta-
rily.43 That decision, however, did not impose the voluntariness
requirement upon the states because the Fifth Amendment's self-
incrimination clause was not held to be binding upon the states
until 1964.44
The Court nevertheless found other grounds upon which to im-
pose the voluntariness requirement on the states. In 1936, in
Brown v. Mississippi, 45 the Court set aside a state conviction on the
rationale that the admission of an involuntary confession violated
the Fourteenth Amendment46 prohibition against a state depriving
(1967); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953);
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Brain v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
40. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). The Court has observed that "a
complex of values underlies the stricture against use by the state of [involuntary] confes-
sions." Id.
For a thorough discussion of the evolution of the constitutional doctrines that underlie
the exclusion of coerced confessions, see Ritz, supra note 4, at 43-51 and Confessions,
supra note 4, at 954-83.
41. See Ritz, supra note 4, at 43-51; see also Confessions, supra note 4, at 959-69.
42. This Note concentrates on the federal constitutional requirement of
voluntariness. For a discussion of the common law requirement of voluntariness, see
CLEARY, supra note 1, § 146, at 372.
43. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). The Fifth Amendment provides
in pertinent part:
No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
44. See CLEARY, supra note 1, § 147, at 373. The Fifth Amendment was held to be
binding upon the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
45. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
46. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
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a person of life or liberty without due process of law.47 The Brown
Court observed that a trial serves only as a pretense in those in-
stances where a conviction is based solely upon a confession elic-
ited by violent means.48 The Court also predicated its decision on
the belief that such confessions may be inherently unreliable as
evidence.49
Despite the narrow holding in Brown,"0 the Court's subsequent
rulings clarified its position that any type of coerced confession
would not be tolerated.5' Moreover, in 1958, the Court in Payne v.
Arkansas52 further established that the introduction of a coerced
confession in a criminal trial violates due process even if there may
have been other evidence sufficient to support the conviction.
53
Consistent with this, in Lynumn v. Illinois,54 the Court rejected as
impermissible the argument that the error in such instances was
harmless because other evidence existed to establish the defend-
ant's guilt.55
These post-Brown cases acknowledged that coerced confessions
were not excluded from evidence solely because of their inherent
unreliability. 6 The Court thus began to search for a stronger con-
stitutional basis upon which to exclude coerced confessions.5 7 The
Court gradually adopted theories of exclusion including the notion
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
47. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. According to one source:
[Beginning with Brown, the Court] radically changed the law; it has imposed
limitations on the admissibility of confessions, deriving from the fundamental
notion that the interrogation at which a confession is obtained is a part of the
process by which the state procures a conviction, and therefore subject to the
requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.... [T]he
Court has encountered great difficulties in deciding just what process is due at
interrogation.
Confessions, supra note 4, at 962.
48. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
49. See LILLY, supra note 1, § 9.12, at 438.
50. The decision applied to those convictions that rested solely upon a physically
coerced confession. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
51. LILLY, supra note 1, § 9.12, at 438.
52. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
53. Id. at 567-68.
54. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
55. Id. at 537.
56. See LILLY, supra note 1, § 9.12, at 438-39; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,
236 (1941).
57. See Ritz, supra note 4, at 44 (citing Lisenba as the first case in which the Court
recognized that "the evidence theory of untrustworthiness did not provide a satisfactory
constitutional basis for overturning state convictions").
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that police practices designed to coerce a suspect into incriminat-
ing himself would not be tolerated because such practices are in-
compatible with our system of justice.58 The Court also excluded
coerced confessions because it sought to protect the values under-
lying the Fifth Amendment. 9
2. Coerced Confessions and Harmless Error
In 1967, in Chapman v. California,60 the Supreme Court held
that some constitutional errors are subject to the harmless error
doctrine. 61 The Chapman Court expressly stated, however, that a
harmless error analysis should never be applied to those constitu-
tional rights that are considered fundamental to a fair trial.62 The
Court identified three such rights: the right to counsel; the right to
an impartial judge; and the right to have coerced confessions ex-
cluded from evidence.63 The Chapman Court further elaborated
that the harmless error analysis could never apply to coerced con-
fessions because the defendant is entitled to a new trial without the
taint of a constitutional violation even if it can be argued that the
confession had been unnecessary to the conviction. 6"
After Chapman, the Court continued to hold that due process is
denied whenever a defendant's coerced confession is used against
him at trial.65 Indeed, the Court consistently has interpreted the
Chapman decision as commanding a rule of "automatic reversal"
in coerced confession cases.66 Moreover, even though the Court in
Rose v. Clark 67 noted the strong interests that support the harm-
58. LILLY, supra note 1, § 9.12, at 439.
59. Id.
60. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
61. Id. at 22. In Chapman, the Court held that "before a federal constitutional error
can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24. The Chapman Court observed: "All 50 States
have harmless-error statutes or rules, and the United States long ago through its Con-
gress established for its courts the rule that judgments shall not be reversed for 'errors or
defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.' " Id. at 22 (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2111 (1964)). The Chapman Court thus found that "there may be some consti-
tutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignifi-
cant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not
requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction." Id.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id. at 23 n.8.
64. Id. at 23-24.
65. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978).
66. See EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 148, at 314 n.35
(2d ed. 1972).
67. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
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less error doctrine,68 it nevertheless found that the admission of a
coerced confession aborted the trial process, 69 and thus could never
be subject to a harmless error analysis.7 °
III. ARIZONA v. FULMINANTE 71
A. - The Facts
On September 14, 1982, Oreste Fulminante contacted the Mesa
Police Department and notified them that his eleven-year-old step-
daughter, Jeneane Hunt, had disappeared. 72 Fulminante had been
taking care of Jeneane while her mother, Mary, was in the hospital
undergoing surgery.73 Shortly after he called the police to notify
them that Jeneane was missing, Fulminante went to the hospital to
bring Mary home.74 Fulminante told his wife that Jeneane had not
come home the previous night."
Two days later, on September 16, 1982, Jeneane's body was
found in the desert outside of Mesa.76 She had a ligature around
her neck and had been shot twice in the head at close range with a
large calibre weapon.77 Due to the decomposed condition of her
body, the pathologist was unable to determine whether she had
been sexually assaulted.78
Fulminante became a suspect in the investigation of Jeneane's
murder after making several inconsistent statements to the police
about her disappearance and his relationship with her.79 No
charges were filed against him at that time, however, and Fulmi-
nante left Arizona to go to New Jersey.8°
During their investigation of Jeneane's murder, the police dis-
covered that on September 13, 1982, Fulminante had traded a rifle
for an extra barrel for his .357 calibre revolver at a Mesa gun
68. Id. at 577.-
69. Id. at 578 n.6.
70. Id. at 588-89 (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. Arizona v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602 (Ariz. 1988), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
72. 778 P.2d at 605.
73. 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
74. 778 P.2d at 605.
75. Id.
76. 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Fulminante maintained that he had instructed Jeneane in the use of firearms
and that he had a good relationship with her. Jeneane's mother denied both of these
claims. 778 P.2d at 605-06.
80. 778 P.2d at 606.
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shop.8" The police also learned that Fulminante had a criminal
record that included a felony conviction for impairing the morals
of a child. 2 After the Mesa police notified the federal authorities
about the information they had accumulated, the federal authori-
ties arrested Fulminante in New Jersey and charged him with pos-
session of a firearm by a felon. 3 Fulminante was then transported
to Phoenix, Arizona,8 4 convicted in the United States District
Court, and sentenced to a minimum of two years in federal
prison. 5 After his release from prison, he was arrested again on
another charge of possession of a firearm. 6 He was convicted
again and sentenced to two more years in prison.8 '
To serve this sentence, Fulminante was sent to the Ray Brook
Federal Correctional Institution in New York.8 8 During his im-
prisonment, he became friends with another inmate, Anthony
Sarivola, who was serving a 60-day sentence for extortion. 9
Sarivola was a former police officer who once had been involved in
organized crime."° At the time he met Fulminante, Sarivola was a
paid informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 91 As an
informant at Ray Brook, Sarivola pretended to be an organized
crime figure.92
After the two had become friends, Sarivola heard a rumor that
Fulminante had killed a child. 93 When Sarivola inquired about the
rumor, Fulminante repeatedly denied any involvement in Jeneane's
murder.94 Sarivola informed his FBI agent-contact about the ru-
mor and the agent told him to find out more.95
One evening in October, 1983, Sarivola told Fulminante that he
81. Id.
82. Id. Fulminante was convicted of impairing the morals of a child in 1965, in New
Jersey. His record also included a 1971 New Jersey conviction for passing a forged
check. Id.
83. Id. Fulminante was arrested for violating 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) (1982) (re-
pealed 1986), which prohibited possession of a firearm by a felon. Id.
84. 778 P.2d at 606.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
91. 778 P.2d at 606.
92. Id.
93. 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
94. Id. Fulminante told conflicting stories to Sarivola about Jeneane's murder. At
one point, he told him that bikers had killed her. In another conversation, Fulminante
contended that he did not know what had happened. Id.
95. 778 P.2d at 606.
1991]
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knew that the other inmates were treating Fulminante roughly.96
Sarivola offered to protect him if Fulminante would tell him the
truth about Jeneane's murder. 97 Fulminante subsequently told
Sarivola that he had driven Jeneane out to the desert on his motor-
cycle and then had shot her twice in the head.9
On November 28, 1983, Sarivola was released from prison.99
Fulminante was released from Ray Brook in May 1984,100 and was
picked up at a bus terminal by Sarivola and Sarivola's fianc6e,
Donna. 10 1 At that time, Fulminante told Donna that he could not
go back to his home because he had murdered a little girl in
Arizona. 102
A month after his release from Ray Brook, Fulminante was ar-
rested in New York for yet another weapons violation. 103 On Sep-
tember 4, 1984, Fulminante was indicted for the first-degree
murder of Jeneane. 104 In December 1985, a jury found Fulminante
guilty of the murder.10 5 In its special verdict, the trial court found
that Fulminante had committed murder "in an especially cruel,
heinous and depraved manner." 1°3 Fulminante was sentenced to
death after the court found that there were no mitigating circum-
stances sufficient to overcome the aggravating circumstances of the
murder. 107
B. The Decisions of the Lower Courts
The trial court denied Fulminante's motion to suppress his con-
fession to Sarivola because the court determined that Fulminante's
confession had been made voluntarily. 10 8 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Arizona originally found that the confession had been
made involuntarily as the result of extreme coercion from Sarivola,
96. 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
97. Id.
98. Id. Fulminante told Sarivola that he choked Jeneane and sexually assaulted her.
Id. He also stated that he made her beg for her life before he murdered her. Id. Fulmi-
nante told Sarivola that he hid the .357 calibre revolver that he used to murder Jeneane in
a pile of rocks near the murder scene. 778 P.2d at 606.
99. 778 P.2d at 606.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. Fulminante was indicted pursuant to ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105
(1983). Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 608-09.
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a paid government informant.' °9 Accordingly, the court held that
the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the voluntariness
issue."10 As a result, the court held that the record failed to sup-
port the trial court's finding of voluntariness"' and that Fulmi-
nante's statements to Sarivola should have been suppressed." 2
Notwithstanding these initial determinations, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that any error in the instruction on the volun-
tariness of Fulminante's confession to Sarivola was "harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt" because Fulminante's second confession
to Sarivola's fianc6e, along with some physical evidence, estab-
lished his guilt." 3 The court thus held that Fulminante's coerced
109. Id. The court found that Sarivola knew that Fulminante was at risk for being
physically harmed by the other inmates because Fulminante was a suspected child mo-
lester. Id. Sarivola used this knowledge to obtain Fulminate's confession by promising
Fulminante protection from the other inmates in exchange for the truth about his step-
daughter's murder. Id. The court found that "Sarivola's promise was 'extremely coer-
cive' because the obvious inference from the promise was that [Fulminante's] life would
be in jeopardy if he did not confess." Id.
110. 778 P.2d at 609. The trial court had instructed the jury that:
You must not consider any statements made by the defendant to a law enforce-
ment officer unless you determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
made the statements voluntarily. The defendant's statement is not voluntary
whenever a law enforcement officer used any sort of violence or threats or any
promise of immunity or benefit.
Id. The Arizona Supreme Court observed that even though the trial court had instructed
the jury on the issue of voluntariness, it had failed to instruct the jury as to whether
Sarivola was a law enforcement officer within the meaning of the instruction. Id. The
Arizona Supreme Court thus held that the trial court erred in not tendering such an
instruction. Id. Moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court found that Sarivola was a paid
government agent at the time of Fulminante's confession. Id.
111. Id. After observing that Fulminante had confessed to Sarivola in response to his
offer of protection, the Arizona Supreme Court wrote: "To be deemed free and voluntary
within the meaning of the fifth amendment, a confession must not have been obtained by
'any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influ-
ence.' . . . These standards also apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment."
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532,
543 (1897)).
112. Id. In Arizona, confessions are considered prima facie involuntary, and the
State carries the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the confes-
sion was made voluntarily. Id. According to the Arizona Supreme Court, the State
failed to meet this burden. Id. In response to Fulminante's motion to suppress the con-
fessions, the State alleged that Fulminante had never indicated either that he was afraid
of the other inmates or that he wanted Sarivola's protection. Id. The State also main-
tained that the defendant spoke to Sarivola in a conversational manner when he discussed
the murder. Id. According to the court, the State's response was "insufficient to create a
prima facie establishment of voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
113. Id. at 609-10. Although the court cited Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967), for the federal standard of harmless error, it went on to observe that: "Federal
courts have approached the determination of harmless error on a case-by-case basis.
When a subsequent confession is obtained constitutionally, there is a definite inclination
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 23
first confession was merely "cumulative" of his admissible second
confession to Sarivola's fianc6e." 4
After the Arizona Supreme Court rendered its original opinion
in the case, Fulminante moved for reconsideration arguing, inter
alia, that federal constitutional law precludes a harmless error
analysis regarding the use of a coerced confession.Is In its supple-
mental opinion, the court acknowledged that a long line of
Supreme Court precedent supported the rule that a harmless error
analysis may not be applied to coerced confessions." 6 Since the
court had determined that Fulminante's confession to Sarivola had
been coerced, the majority" 17 of the court held that Fulminate was
entitled to a new trial without the use of his coerced confession." 8
Thus, Fulminante's conviction and sentence were set aside, and the
case was remanded for a new trial." 9 The United States Supreme
Court granted the State's petition for certiorari. 20
to hold that the admission of prior 'inadmissible' confessions constitutes harmless error."
Id. at 610.
114. 778 P.2d at 611.
115. Id. at 626 (Moeller, J., supplemental opinion). According to the Arizona
Supreme Court, "the defendant correctly pointed out that the cases we relied upon to
support our harmless error analysis were not cases in which the first .confession was a
coerced confession in violation of defendant's fifth amendment rights. Instead, these
cases involved confessions obtained in violation of defendant's Miranda rights." Id.
116. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court noted that "There is an unbroken line of au-
thority supporting the rule that, although receipt of a confession obtained in violation of
Miranda may be harmless, the harmless error doctrine does not apply to coerced confes-
sions." Id.
117. Id. One justice, Justice Cameron, dissented in the supplemental opinion. Jus-
tice Cameron believed that the harmless error doctrine was applicable. Id. at 628
(Cameron, J., dissenting). He wrote, "At this time... I question the blanket assumption
that the admission of any coerced confession is per se harmful and therefore reversible."
Id. (Cameron, J., dissenting). He further elaborated:
A review of the case law mandates that a court should look to the circum-
stances surrounding the involuntary confession. If the confession was a result
of the type of coercion found in Payne, Jackson, and Mincey, then admission of
the incriminating statement will constitute reversible error. If, however, the
involuntary confession is only "coerced" in a technical sense, and is merely
duplicative of other testimony or admissible statements of the defendant, then a
harmless error analysis is appropriate. Additionally, if the record reveals over-
whelming evidence of defendant's guilt, any error in admitting such statements
may be considered harmless.
Id. at 632-33 (Cameron, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 627. According to the Arizona Supreme Court, "until and unless the
[United States] Supreme Court changes the law, we must order defendant retried without
the use of the coerced confession." Id.
119. Id.
I 2U. Arizona v. Fulminante, I10 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
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C. The Opinion of the Supreme Court 2 '
Technically, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Arizona Supreme Court.1 22 The Court employed different reason-
ing, however, than that upon which the Arizona Supreme Court
had relied. 2 3 In shifting coalitions, 24 the Supreme Court held that
Fulminante's confession was coerced, that the harmless error anal-
ysis applies to coerced confessions, but that the admission of
Fulminante's confession to Sarivola was not harmless error. Each
of these holdings will be discussed in turn.
1. The Coerced Confession Holding
Although the Court normally accords great deference to the fac-
tual findings made by state courts, the issue of whether a confes-
sion was made voluntarily requires an independent determination
by the federal reviewing court. 2 s The Court observed that a show-
ing of actual physical violence by a government agent against the
accused is not required for a confession to be considered co-
erced. 26 As long as a "credible threat" exists, a confession will be
deemed involuntary. 2 7 The Court, therefore, affirmed the Arizona
Supreme Court's finding that Fulminante's confession had been co-
erced because the "credible threat" of physical violence by other
inmates caused him to confess to Sarivola.128
2. The Harmless Error Analysis Holding
In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the harmless error
analysis is applicable to the erroneous admission of coerced confes-
sions. The Court based its reasoning on two premises: (1) that
121. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and
IV. He also filed a dissenting opinion in Part III. Id. at 1249. Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined in Parts I, II, III, and IV of Justice White's opinion. Id.
Justice Scalia joined Parts I and II. Id. Justice Kennedy joined Parts I and IV. Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered an opinion, Part II of which was for the Court,
concluding that a harmless error analysis is applicable to the admission of involuntary
coerced confessions. Id. The Chief Justice also filed a dissenting opinion in Parts I and
III. Id. Justice O'Connor joined Parts I, II, and III of that opinion. Justices Kennedy
and Souter joined Parts I and II. Id. Justice Scalia joined in Part II and Part III. Id.
Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id.
122. Id. at 1250.
123. Id.
124. See supra note 121.
125. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1252 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110
(1985)).
126. Id. at 1252-53.
127. Id. at 1253; see supra note 36.
128. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1253.
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such an admission is mere "trial error"; and (2) that such an error
does not transcend the criminal process.
a. Characterization of the Admission of a Coerced Confession as
Mere "Trial Error"
The Court observed that since Chapman v. California,'29 the
Court has applied a harmless error analysis to several different
types of constitutional errors and has recognized that most such
errors can be harmless.1 31 Writing for the majority on this issue,
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that:
The common thread connecting these cases is that each involved
"trial error"--error which occurred during the presentation of
the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively
assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to
determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. 13
1
Rehnquist further observed that the primary purpose of a criminal
trial is to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence. 132 Accord-
ing to the Chief Justice, the harmless error doctrine promotes this
truthseeking objective. 33 Rehnquist also contended that the harm-
less error doctrine fosters public respect for the criminal process
because it places the emphasis on the fairness of the trial instead of
focusing on the immaterial error that is almost always present in
any trial. 34
Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished "trial errors"-those er-
rors that are subject to the harmless error analysis-from "struc-
tural defects" in the trial process-those errors that are not subject
to such an analysis. 35 Structural defects, according to Rehnquist,
influence the entire trial process because they affect the framework
in which the trial is conducted. ' 36 Trial errors, on the other hand,
reflect an error within the actual trial process. 137
With these premises as a foundation, the Court proceeded to
129. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
130. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1263.
131. Id. at 1264.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
135. Id. at 1264-65. Some of the constitutional violations that would be considered
structural defects, rather than trial errors, are: the total deprivation of the right to coun-
sel at trial; the failure to appoint an impartial iud2e to nreside nv.r 0h- t. ..- .1-..
pipent oneseit at tral; and the right to a public trial. Id. at 1265.
136. Id. at 1265.
137. Id.
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hold that the admission of involuntary confessions constitutes
"trial error," similar to the improper admission of other types of
inadmissible evidence.1"8 Thus, when reviewing such an error, an
appellate court need only review the remaining independent evi-
dence to decide whether the admission of the coerced confession
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 13 9
b. The Erroneous Admission of a Coerced Confession as
"Transcending the Criminal Process"
According to Rehnquist, the admission of an involuntary confes-
sion is not the type of error that "transcends the criminal process"
because the harmless error analysis has been applied in other cases
that involved police misconduct and the violation of other consti-
tutional rights.'" Chief Justice Rehnquist thus reasoned that con-
fessions elicited as a result of Fourteenth Amendment violations
should not be treated differently from confessions obtained as a
result of Sixth Amendment violations. 141
Rehnquist acknowledged that in some instances a coerced con-
fession may affect a trial more dramatically than other types of
trial errors. 42 Rehnquist concluded, however, that in those cases
the appellate court will simply determine that the erroneous admis-
sion of the confession was not a harmless error. 143
3. The Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Holding
After the Court found that Fulminante's confession had been
coerced and that the admission of a coerced confession should be
subject to a harmless error analysis, it was necessary to determine
whether the admission of Fulminante's confession was "harmless
error beyond a reasonable doubt."'" The Court had to decide
whether Arizona had met its burden of proving that the admission
of Fulminante's confession had not contributed to his convic-
tion. "'45 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the State
failed to meet this burden. 146 Consequently, the Court affirmed the
138. Fulminante, III S. Ct. at 1265.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1266.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1257.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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lower court's judgment and reversed Fulminante's conviction.147
In reaching its conclusion that the admission of the confession
was not harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court first
considered the particularly damaging nature of confessions. 4 '
Specifically, the Court noted that when a defendant makes a full
confession, a jury may rely solely upon such a confession in reach-
ing its decision, without regard to the other, evidence presented. 149
In addition, the Court conceded that involuntary confessions may
be unreliable.150 Given these concerns, the Court warned that an
appellate court must proceed cautiously before it determines that
the admission of the confession was harmless error beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 1 -1
The Court concluded that at least four considerations mandated
the decision that, the State had failed to carry its burden of estab-
lishing that the admission of Fulminante's confession was harmless
error beyond a reasonable doubt. 15 2 First, the Court noted that
without Fulminante's confession to Sarivola, it was highly unlikely
that Fulminante ever would have been prosecuted for the murder
because there was scant physical evidence linking him to the
crime.' 3  Second, although Fulminante later confessed to
Sarivola's fianc6e, the jury's assessment of this second confession
"could easily have depended in large part" upon his prior confes-
sion to Sarivola. 5 4 - In particular, without Fulminante's original
confession to Sarivola, the jury may not have believed Sarivola's
fianc6e's story.5 5 The Court rejected the State's argument that one
147. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1257.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1258.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1258-60.
153. Id. at 1258.
154. Id.
155. Id. The Court noted'that Fulminante's confession to Donna allegedly took
place during a ride that Sarivola and she were giving Fulminante on the day he was
released from Ray Brook. Id. at 1258-59. Sometime during the course of the trip, Donna
asked Fulminante why he was not going to Arizona to see his friends and family. Id. at
1259. Donna stated that, in response to her innocuous inquiry, Fulminante made a full
confession to her, even though it was the first time that they had met. Id. The Court also
noted that, despite her alleged disgust for Fulminante, she went on a later trip with him.
Id. Donna hardly discussed the confession with Sarivola, who allegedly overheard it in
the car. Id. Moreover, both Donna and-Sarivola failed to notify the authorities about
this alleged confession until several months later. Id. The Court observed that the jurors
... ....f...., Za Dum.a iimi a motive to faorlcate the confession because Sarivola
received many benefits from the federal authorities. Id. Donna also received favorable
treatment and was placed in the Witness Protection Program. Id.
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confession was "merely cumulative of the other."' 15 6
In addition, the Court found that the admission of Fulminante's
confession to Sarivola led to the admission of other evidence preju-
dicial to Fulminante.'" 7 Finally, the Court believed that the sen-
tencing phase of the trial was also influenced by the admission of
the first confession. 58 Accordingly, the majority of the Court de-
termined that the admission of Fulminante's involuntary confes-
sion was not harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 15 9
D. The Dissent 160
In dissenting from the majority's harmless error holding, Justice
White vigorously protested the Court's holding that the harmless
error rule is applicable to erroneously admitted coerced confes-
sions.1 6 ' White argued that the majority's holding ignored the
well-established proposition that whenever a defendant's involun-
tary confession is introduced into evidence, the defendant has been
deprived of due process even though other evidence may support
the conviction. 162 Justice White maintained that the admission of a
coerced confession may never be subject to a harmless error
analysis. 163
Justice White also disagreed with the majority's contention that
because a harmless error analysis -previously had been applied to
other types of trial errors, such an analysis could be applied to this
156. Id. Even though some of the details in Fulminante's alleged confession to
Donna were corroborated by circumstantial evidence, many were noi. Id. Furthermore,
the only corroborating evidence of Fulminante's state of mind and motive as given in the
second confession was to be found in the first. Id. Therefore, according to the Court,
"contrary to what the Arizona Supreme Court found, it is clear that the jury might have
believed that the two confessions reinforced and corroborated each other." Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1260.
159. Id. at 1261.
160. Justice White, who wrote the dissent on this particular issue, "took the highly
unusual step" of reading his opinion from the bench. Linda Greenhouse, High Court, 5
to 4, Softens Stand Against Confession by Coercion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1991, at Al.
161. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1253-57 (White, J., dissenting).
162. According to Justice White:
The majority today abandons what until now the Court has regarded as the
"axiomatic [proposition] that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due
process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involun-
tary confession without regard to the truth or falsity of the confession, and even
though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the
conviction."
Id. at 1253 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
163. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958)).
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type of error as well.' 64 He observed that a coerced confession is
fundamentally different from the other types of inadmissible evi-
dence to which a harmless error analysis has been applied. 165
Justice White emphasized that in Chapman v. California,166 the
Court recognized that prior cases had held some constitutional
rights to be so fundamental to a fair trial that their violation can
never be considered harmless error.1 67 The Court in Chapman spe-
cifically placed the constitutional rule excluding the defendant's
coerced confession from evidence into that category.1
61
According to Justice White, the majority's holding was predi-
cated upon a meaningless classification scheme in which it at-
tempted to categorize a constitutional error as either a "trial error"
or a "structural error."1 69 Justice White observed that the Court
had not placed the constitutional errors previously held to be sub-
ject to a harmless error analysis in such mutually exclusive
categories. 1 7
0
Justice White further observed that a confession may well be the
most "probative and damaging evidence" admitted against a crimi-
nal defendant.1 71 In particular, he noted that it is impossible for a
reviewing court to determine what credit and weight the jury gave
to an erroneously admitted confession. 1 7
2
Finally, Justice White observed that one of the most important
reasons for excluding coerced confessions is that the police prac-
tices sometimes used to extract such admissions offend our system
of justice.1 73 Thus, in accordance with the Court's prior decisions,
the dissent would have upheld the long-established rule that the
erroneous admission of a coerced confession should never be sub-
ject to a harmless error analysis. 174
IV. ANALYSIS
In Arizona v. Fulminante, the Supreme Court improperly held
that a harmless error analysis may be applied to the erroneous ad-
164. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
166. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
167. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 & n.8).
169. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1255 (White, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting)).
i72. id. (White, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 1256 (White, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting).
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mission of a coerced confession. In so holding, the Court not only
disregarded the doctrine of stare decisis,'17 but it also disavowed
the reality of coercive police practices. 76 As a result, Fulminante
symbolizes a patchwork of rationalizations and justifications that
may eventually work to subvert constitutional protections previ-
ously afforded by our criminal justice system.
A. The Court's Disregard of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis
As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized,
the doctrine of stare decisis is fundamental to the rule of law. 177
Consequently, the Court has overruled prior decisions only when
compelling evidence demonstrates the necessity of doing so. 178
Fulminante, however, did not present such a necessity. Compel-
ling evidence has not yet been produced to illustrate the necessity
for the Court to reverse the well-established rules that: (1) the ad-
mission of a coerced confession requires the automatic reversal of
the conviction upon appeal; and (2) such an admission may not be
subject to harmless error analysis.
For nearly a century, the Supreme Court held that the erroneous
admission of a coerced confession in a criminal trial would vitiate a
conviction. Although the theoretical underpinnings of this rule
sometimes varied, the Court never wavered in its pronouncement
that involuntary confessions simply would not be tolerated in our
system of justice. 179 In accordance with this principle, both pre-
Chapman 18o and post-Chapman 181 cases consistently held that the
175. The doctrine of stare decisis requires a court "[t]o abide by, or adhere to, de-
cided cases .... [It is the p]olicy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled
point." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). "Stare decisis insures that 'the
law will not merely change erratically' and 'permits society to presume that bedrock prin-
ciples are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals.'" Brief Amicus
Curiae of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Respon-
dent at 18, Fulminante (No. 89-839) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265
(1986)); see infra notes 177-201 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 202-22 and accompanying text.
177. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987).
178. Brief for Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers in Support of Respondent at 18, Fulminante (No. 89-839).
179. According to Justice White, historically the admission of an involuntary confes-
sion vitiated the judgment because such a judgment violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1253 (White, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing fourteen Supreme Court decisions in support of this proposition).
180. For a list of pre-Chapman cases, see Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Asso-
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support of Respondent at 15, Fulminante (No.
89-839).
181. For a list of post-Chapman cases, see Fulminante, I I I S. Ct. at 1254 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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admission of a coerced confession could never be subject to a
harmless error analysis. 8 2 The doctrine of stare decisis, therefore,
dictates that the Court should continue to follow the well estab-
lished rule that the introduction of a coerced confession into evi-
dence requires an automatic reversal upon appeal.
In Fulminante, however, the Rehnquist majority essentially re-
pudiated the principle of stare decisis when it abruptly veered off
the course charted and travelled by the Court for over nine de-
cades.' 3 The Court failed to offer an adequate explanation or to
point to any compelling evidence that justified its decision to over-
rule decades worth of precedent.'8 4 Evidently, the Court was en-
gaged in a goal-oriented process'8 5 whereby it either distorted or
ignored prior decisions in an attempt to justify a holding that was
otherwise without any authoritative support.18 6
In his dissent, Justice White enumerated several compelling rea-
sons why prior cases made it clear that the admission of a coerced
confession should never be subject to a harmless error analysis."8 7
Nevertheless, the means by which the majority reached a contrary
end are so fatally flawed that they deserve separate criticism.
As justification for his decision to overturn the longstanding au-
tomatic reversal rule, Chief Justice Rehnquist ostensibly relied on
Chapman v. California.8 8 His reliance was misplaced, however,
because he misconstrued the harmless error analysis adopted in
Chapman. The Chapman Court adopted an analysis which de-
mands that a reviewing court determine that the federal constitu-
tional error was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.8 9
According to Rehnquist, this analysis suggests that it is possible to
conduct a quantitative assessment to determine whether such an
182. See, e.g.. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963); Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945).
183. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
184. "The party advocating the abandonment of an established precedent bears the
heavy burden of establishing the articulable reasons necessary for any detour from the
straight path of stare decisis." Brief for Amicus Curiae of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Respondent at 18, Fulminante (No. 89-839).
185. According to one writer, Chief Justice Rehnquist had waited 39 years for the
opportunity to hold that a harmless error analysis is applicable to coerced confessions.
See Linda Greenhouse, Washington Talk- Of Rehnquist's Mission, and Patience to
Match, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1991, at A18.
186. In a later opinion, Justice Marshall warned that "[p]ower, not reason, is the new
currency of this Court's decision-making." Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619
(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
o97. See supra notes I W-74 and accompanying text.
188. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
189. Id. at 24.
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error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 90 Rehnquist's
quantitative formulation of the Chapman analysis simply fails to
give adequate consideration to the Chapman Court's own con-
struction of harmless error analysis.
First, the Chapman Court held that a harmless error analysis
may be applied only to a special category of constitutional er-
rors. 19' Specifically excluded from this category was the admission
into evidence of a coerced confession. 92 Second, the Chapman
Court indicated that it was adhering to the harmless error analysis
adopted by the Supreme Court in Fahy v. Connecticut.193 In Fahy,
the Court found that the question to be resolved in a harmless er-
ror analysis is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
erroneously admitted evidence may have contributed to the de-
fendant's conviction. 194 The Chapman Court expressly acknowl-
edged that its own formulation of the harmless error analysis and
the analysis adopted in Fahy were virtually identical. 195
Further, even assuming that it may be constitutionally permissi-
ble to apply a harmless error analysis to the admission of a coerced
confession, the very nature of a defendant's confession requires
that such an error could never be found harmless under the Chap-
man analysis outlined above. By definition, a confession consists of
a defendant's own admission of guilt. 196 As such, a confession is
probably the most damaging evidence that can be admitted against
a defendant, and it can be expected to have a tremendous impact
on the jury.'97 Indeed, a jury may rely entirely upon an involun-
tary confession in reaching its decision.198 Thus, in those instances
where an involuntary confession was admitted into evidence, there
will always be a reasonable possibility that the confession at least
contributed to the conviction. According to the harmless error
analysis spelled out in Fahy and Chapman, such an error may
never be held harmless.
Despite the logical conclusion that the admission of a coerced
confession may never be harmless error, the Rehnquist majority
nevertheless held that such an error is subject to a harmless error
190. Arizona v. Fulminante, III S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991).
191. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
192. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.
193. Id. at 23 (referring to Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963)).
194. Id. (quoting Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86-87).
195. Id. at 24.
196. See supra note 1.
197. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1257 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40 (1968)).
198. Id. at 1258 (White, J., dissenting).
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analysis. This holding requires that reviewing courts go through
the internally inconsistent and meaningless motions of conducting
an "analysis" from which the court may reach only one conclu-
sion: that the error was not harmless. Such a harmless error anal-
ysis clearly would constitute a waste of judicial resources.
There is yet another glaring defect in the Fulminante Court's
justification. According to the Court, a reviewing court need only
determine whether the evidence independent of the confession ren-
ders the admission of the coerced confession harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.199 This formulation, however, provides little
guidance to reviewing courts. Far from being the "simple" quanti-
tative analysis that Rehnquist suggests, such an analysis will prove
to be an extremely difficult standard to apply. This is perhaps best
evidenced by the Fulminante decision itself, in which nine Justices
of the Court were unable to reach a unanimous decision as to
whether the evidence independent of the coerced confession ren-
dered the introduction of the coerced confession harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.2°
As the split in Fulminante indicates, Rehnquist's so-called
"quantitative analysis" simply will not enable reviewing courts to
quantify with any degree of mathematical certainty whether the
erroneous admission of an involuntary confession was "harmless
error beyond a reasonable doubt." Rather, whether such an erro-
neous admission constituted harmless error in a particular instance
will depend upon the subjective view of the appellate court review-
ing the case.2 °1
As courts across the nation struggle with the Supreme Court's
formulation, their efforts will yield inconsistent results. Surely, a
defendant's fundamental right not to have his involuntary confes-
sion introduced against him cannot be entrusted to such a perilous
and subjective position. Accordingly, the erroneous admission of a
coerced confession should never be subjected to a harmless error
analysis.
B. The Court's Disavowal of the Lessons of Police Brutality
In Fulminante, the Supreme Court acted in complete disregard
of the wisdom inherent in a substantial body of well-established
199. Id. at 1265.
200. Five Justices held that the admission of the involuntary confession was not
S__ I -- T3 . .. J.a.. ,3__ ....... L aS it. t ItN,.
201. See Bob Cohn, Coerced Confessions: No Harm Done, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 8,
1991, at 52.
[Vol. 23
Arizona v. Fulminante
precedent. In doing so, the Fulminante Court also acted in a
frightening disavowal of the lessons of history which prior Court
decisions had wholeheartedly embraced.
The Fulminante Court contends that the admission of an invol-
untary confession is not the type of error which "transcends the
criminal process. ' 20 2 Even a cursory review of the relevant confes-
sion case law, however, serves as a disturbing reminder of the
abuses that have occurred in the Anglo-American system of jus-
tice. Indeed, the Court consistently has acknowledged that
"[flormulas or respect for constitutional safeguards cannot prevail
over the facts of life which contradict them. They may not become
a cloak for inquisitorial practices and make an empty form of the
due process of law for which free men fought and died. 20 3
Coerced confessions are prevalent in inquisitorial systems that
employ inhumane methods to "get the truth" from an accused. 2°
Confessions so obtained may be inherently unreliable as the ac-
cused may scream "I did it!" in a desperate effort to escape the
torment inflicted by his captors. 20  The majority's decision in
Fulminante completely disregards the underlying principle of our
criminal justice system: that we have purposefully adopted an ac-
cusatorial system of justice rather than an inquisitorial one. 206 Our
system of justice requires that the state independently establish a
criminal defendant's guilt without employing coercive police prac-
tices to compel a confession that may later be used against him.20 7
As a society, we find that the brutal methods characteristic of
the inquisitorial system are repugnant to our philosophy of jus-
tice. 20  The methods employed within that system, however, have
202. Fulminante, III S. Ct. at 1265.
203. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948).
204. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 3, at 412; Confessions, supra note 4, at 938.
205. The Court recognized the truth of this proposition almost one hundred years
ago in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). The Brain Court observed, "The
human mind under the pressure of calamity is easily seduced; and is liable, in the alarm
of danger, to acknowledge indiscriminately a falsehood or a truth, as different agitations
may prevail." Id. at 547 (quoting 2 LEACH, HAWKIN'S PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 31,
§ 2 (6th ed. 1787).
206. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). The Rogers Court stated:
[A]n underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is
an accusatorial and not an inquisitional system - a system in which the State
must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not
by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth.
Id. at 540-41.
207. Id. at 540-41.
208. See The Supreme Court's Harmful Error, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991, at A22
("[T]he assumption has always been that forcing a suspect to incriminate himself,
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not been relegated to the pages of our history books."2  The troub-
ling reality is that the law enforcement agents who represent our
own system of justice sometimes employ the same abhorrent meth-
ods of the inquisitorial system. 210 Recognizing that coercive police
practices exist, the Court repeatedly has held that the "fruits of
[such] illicit methods" may not be introduced in evidence.2 1 1 In so
holding, the Court believed that such an exclusionary rule would
serve as a deterrent to those government agents who might other-
wise be tempted to engage in brutal tactics.21 2
The Fulminante Court's holding that a harmless error analysis is
applicable to coerced confessions fails to give adequate considera-
tion to the enduring concerns of police misconduct and its deter-
rence. Although the Court held that the erroneous admission of a
coerced confession theoretically may be held harmless only in
those instances where there is other evidence to support the convic-
tion, this requirement will fail to deter shrewd police officers who
desire quick "investigation" results. Indeed, as Justice Frankfurter
once warned:
[I]f law officers learn that from now on they can coerce confes-
sions without risk, since trial judges may admit such confession
provided only that, perhaps through the very process of extorting
them, other evidence has been procured on which a conviction
can be sustained, police in the future even more so than in the
past will take the easy but ugly path of the third degree.21 3
Further, when viewed in the context of police brutality, the re-
quirement that evidence independent of the confession must exist
to support the conviction weakens the Court's argument. It has
been observed that where "the coercive devices used . . . were
designed to obtain admissions which would incontrovertibly com-
plete a case in which there had already been obtained, by proper
investigative efforts, competent evidence sufficient to sustain a con-
through physical abuse, threats or strong inducements, was such reprehensible conduct
that the use of its fruits would make a fair trial impossible.").
209. For an article detailing recent allegations of police brutality in Chicago, see
David Jackson, Fine Line Between Tough Police Work, Brutality, CHI. TRIB., July 14,
1991, § 1, at 1.
210. At a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights in March 1991, it was reported that Justice Department figures
show 48,000 complaints against police over the last six years. See Linda P. Campbell,
Police Brutality Triggers Many Complaints, Little Data, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1991, § 1, at
16.
211. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 607 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., joining in reversal of
212. Id.
213. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 203 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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viction[, t]he procedures ...are ...perhaps more unwarranted
because so unnecessary. "214
Although involuntary confessions obtained by any illegal means
are deemed to be inadmissible, some of the case law indicates that
unscrupulous police officers presently engage in psychological,
rather than physical, coercive activity.215 Yet some police still
physically brutalize criminal suspects. Indeed, the Fulminante de-
cision came at a time when the videotaped beating of a suspect by
Los Angeles police officers focused national attention on the issue
of police brutality.2 16 The Supreme Court, however, shamefully ig-
nores this reality in its Fulminante decision.
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserts that the harmless error doctrine
is essential to the truth-seeking function of the Court.217 As the
Court, however, once recognized:
As important as it is that persons who have committed crimes be
convicted, there are considerations which transcend the question
of guilt or innocence. Thus, in cases involving involuntary con-
fessions, this Court enforces the strongly felt attitude of our soci-
ety that important human values are sacrificed where an agency
of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings
a confession out of an accused against his will. 218
Further, the concern that government agents may attempt to
"beat the system" by engaging in professional misconduct should
not be limited to police officers. As Justice Stevens once cautioned,
the automatic application of harmless error review in cases suscep-
tible to such an analysis will also serve to encourage prosecutors
to subvert constitutional requirements in order to secure
convictions.21 9
Justice Stevens' concern is quite justified in coerced confession
cases. As a result of Fulminante, prosecutors now may be tempted
to use involuntary confessions in their efforts to "win" convictions
in otherwise close cases.22° Whereas prior decisions made it clear
214. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963).
215. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389 (1964) ("As reflected in the cases
in this Court, police conduct requiring exclusion of a confession has evolved from acts of
clear physical brutality to more refined and subtle methods of overcoming a defendant's
will.").
216. See, e.g., Richard Lacayo, Confessions That Were Taboo Are Now Just A Techni-
cality, TIME, Apr. 8, 1991, at 26.
217. Arizona v. Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991).
218. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960).
219. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 588-89 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
220. In Chapman v. California, the Court itself acknowledged that "we must recog-
nize that harmless-error rules can work very unfair and mischievous results when, for
example, highly important and persuasive evidence.., though legally forbidden, finds its
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that the introduction of a coerced confession would result in an
automatic reversal upon appeal, that rule will no longer serve as a
constant reminder to "officers" of the court that every government
"221 222agent must "play fair '  in our system of justice.
V. CONCLUSION
Although it is difficult to determine the immediate impact of
Fulminante, the decision eventually may result in widespread
abuses in the criminal justice system and may have a "corrosive
impact on the administration of justice. ' 223 In addition, the Court
has sent a subtle message that the doctrine of stare decisis will no
longer stand as a sentinel to ensure that a state may not benefit
from its wrongdoing.
During an era where the "war on crime" continues to be waged,
the Fulminante decision may prove to be "harmful error." Indeed,
as public concern about crime increases, so too will the pressure
placed upon the police to decide where to set limits when con-
ducting their investigations.224 Although the police are taught to
act within the bounds of the law, the Fulminante decision may re-
inforce their belief that the real message is to get the desired results
at any cost. 2
25
Our society needs to heed the wisdom that "we must give no ear
to the loose talk about society being 'at war with the criminal' if by
that it is implied that the decencies of procedure which have been
enshrined in the Constitution must not be too fastidiously insisted
upon in the case of wicked people. ' 226 Rather than resorting to the
crude law enforcement practices employed in inquisitorial systems,
we must strive to develop more intelligent and sophisticated meth-
ods with which to enforce our laws.227 To do otherwise would be
way into a trial in which the question of guilt or innocence is a close one." Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
221. "[The privilege against self-incrimination] reflects many of our fundamental val-
ues and most noble aspirations: [including] our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair
state-individual' balance .... Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414 n.12 (1966).
222. According to one source, "The ruling may give police more latitude in question-
ing suspects and prosecutors more confidence in using dubious confessions. 'Before this
case prosecutors knew that they risked blowing their whole case if they took a chance
with a bad confession.... Now they can take that chance.' " Cohn, supra note 201, at 52
(quoting University of Michigan law professor Yale Kamisar).
223. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 588 (1986).
224. See Jackson, supra note 209, at 1.
225. id.
226. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 418 (1945).
227. For example, some jurisdictions started videotaping a suspect's confession to
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to wage war not against criminals, but against the fundamental
principles upon which our system of justice is based.
Every day the media provides us with jolting revelations about
the police brutality occurring throughout our nation.228 Often,
these episodes are directed against the poor and uninfluential mem-
bers of our society. 229 As a result of Fulminante, such an individ-
ual now may have lost his only remedy against being subject to
brutality-an automatic reversal in the event that his involuntary
confession is introduced at trial.23°
Whatever Fulminante's ultimate impact, as a civilized society we
cannot afford the message that the decision presently conveys. The
Fulminante Court overturned precedent that had long recognized
that the Constitution does not require the sacrifice of either secur-
ity or liberty.231 Hopefully, in future decisions, the Supreme Court
will recall that "Law triumphs when the natural impulses aroused
by a shocking crime yield to the safeguards which our civilization
has evolved for an administration of criminal justice at once ra-
tional and effective. 232
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preserve it for evidence and to insure that it was made voluntarily. See Melinda Beck et
al., Video Vigilantes, NEWSWEEK, July 22, 1991, at 42; Jackson, supra note 209.
228. For recent statistics about the incidence of police brutality in some of the major
cities across the nation, and for some examples of specific instances in which police bru-
tality has been alleged, see Campbell, supra note 210, at 16.
229. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238 n.11 (1940).
230. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 413 ("Perhaps only because of the utter inadequacy
of the other presently available remedies, the most effective weapons against these illegal
police practices are the evidence rules excluding from the jury certain statements illegally
obtained.").
231. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) ("The Due Process Clause
does not mandate that the police forgo all questioning, or that they be given carte blanche
to extract what they can from a suspect.").
232. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949).
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